

EDITED BY
VARUN UBEROI & TARIQ MODOOD



MULTICULTURALISM RETHOUGHT

INTERPRETATIONS, DILEMMAS
AND NEW DIRECTIONS

MULTICULTURALISM RETHOUGHT

Interpretations, Dilemmas and New Directions

ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF BHIKHU PAREKH



Edited by Varun Uberoi and Tariq Modood

EDINBURGH
University Press

© editorial matter and organisation Varun Uberoi and
Tariq Modood, 2015
© the chapters, their several authors, 2015

Edinburgh University Press Ltd
The Tun – Holyrood Road
12 (2f) Jackson’s Entry
Edinburgh EH8 8PJ
www.euppublishing.com

Typeset in 11/14 Sabon by
Servis Filmsetting Ltd, Stockport, Cheshire
and printed and bound in Great Britain by
CPI Group (UK) Ltd, Croydon CR0 4YY

A CIP record for this book is available from the British Library
ISBN 978 1 4744 0188 3 (hardback)
ISBN 978 1 4744 0190 6 (paperback)
ISBN 978 1 4744 0189 0 (webready PDF)
ISBN 978 1 4744 0191 3 (epub)

The right of the contributors to be identified as
authors of this work has been asserted in accordance
with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 and
the Copyright and Related Rights Regulations 2003
(SI No. 2498).

Contents

<i>Acknowledgements</i>	vii
<i>Preface by Tariq Modood</i>	viii
<i>List of Contributors</i>	xi
Introduction – Parekhian Multiculturalism <i>Varun Uberoi</i>	1
Part I Interpreting Parekh	
1. Situating Parekh’s Multiculturalism: Bhikhu Parekh and Twentieth-Century British Political Theory <i>Paul Kelly</i>	29
2. Gandhi, Intercultural Dialogue and Global Ethics: An Interpretive Commentary on Bhikhu Parekh’s Work <i>Thomas Pantham</i>	55
3. National Identities and Moving Beyond Conservative and Liberal Nationalism <i>Varun Uberoi</i>	75
Part II Elucidating and Addressing Multicultural Dilemmas	
4. At the Borders of Otherness: Tracing Feminism through Bhikhu Parekh’s Multiculturalism <i>Monica Mookherjee</i>	97

CONTENTS

5. Liberty, Equality and Accommodation <i>Peter Jones</i>	126
6. Parekh's Multiculturalism and Secularism: Religions in Political Life <i>Rajeev Bhargava</i>	157
7. Identity, Values and the Law <i>Raymond Plant</i>	183
Part III New Directions	
8. The Essentialist Critique of Multiculturalism: Theories, Policies, Ethos <i>Will Kymlicka</i>	209
9. Beyond Rules and Rights: Multiculturalism and the Inclusion of Immigrants <i>Joseph H. Carens</i>	250
10. Multiculturalism and the Public Sphere <i>Andrew Gamble</i>	273
11. Can Democracy be Multicultural? Can Multiculturalism be Democratic? <i>Benjamin R. Barber</i>	300
12. Interculturalism, Multiculturalism <i>Charles Taylor</i>	329
13. Rethinking Multiculturalism, Interculturalisms and the Majority <i>Tariq Modood</i>	348
<i>Index</i>	369

Acknowledgements

This volume would not have been possible without funding and support from the Economic and Social Research Council (PTA-026-27-2736), Brunel University's Magna Carta Institute, Bristol University's Centre for Ethnicity and Citizenship and the University of Westminster's Centre for the Study of Democracy. They allowed the Bhikhu Parekh Symposium, at which the chapters in this volume were discussed, to occur. Likewise, John Dunn, Anthony Giddens, Chandran Kukathas, Andrew Mason, Susan Mendus, David Miller, Albert Weale and Ziauddin Sardar carefully read and responded to the papers being discussed so as to make suggestions on how to improve them. Raymond Plant was initially going to be an editor of the volume but he became a valuable chapter author and gave feedback on certain chapters too. The publisher's reviewers also made important suggestions that helped to improve the volume. But without Bhikhu Parekh's political thought, such a volume would not have been necessary, so we dedicate this book to him in recognition of how he has stimulated our own intellectual work and that of so many others.

V. U.
T. M.

Preface

Tariq Modood

The essays that constitute the chapters in this volume are explorations of various aspects of the political theory of multiculturalism. Each is freestanding and of value in itself but all except one were presented at a symposium to honour the contribution of Bhikhu Parekh to this subject, the political theory of multiculturalism. Some of the chapters are concerned primarily with facets of Parekh's theory; more are concerned primarily with a substantive topic *within the political theory of multiculturalism*, and in this way engage with his contribution. What unites them is the appreciation that Parekh's work on multiculturalism, in particular his book *Rethinking Multiculturalism* (2000; second edition, 2006) is a significant presence that has helped to make this subdiscipline of political philosophy. In the next chapter, Varun Uberoi introduces Parekh's philosophy of multiculturalism and the contents of the book. I would like to start the book – just as the symposium started – with a few words to honour Bhikhu Parekh.

Parekh is a remarkable political philosopher who has published major books on many philosophers and concepts. Political theorists he has written about include Bentham, Marx, Arendt and Oakeshott; among concepts he has written about are justice, equality, ideology and civil association. Moreover, Parekh has thought seriously and continuously about his discipline, about the nature of political philosophy, about how it should be pursued and what it is capable of. Indeed, his work on multiculturalism is only a fraction of his political philosophy output. Yet there is

PREFACE

no doubt that it is his most widely read work on multiculturalism that has stimulated the most response and had the most profound influence. It has played a major role in the intellectual formation of later generations and in creating a sense of where the important issues are and how they should be engaged with. Many of the contributors of this volume said they were keen to participate in this project because of what Bhikhu Parekh meant to them.

To several of us this does not refer to political philosophy alone but has at least two other important aspects. First, there is his example of public service and intellectual public engagement, which has been impressive, and an inspiration and a guide to others. Parekh was a member of some of the earliest British government commissions on racial disadvantage and multiculturalism, initially in relation to schooling, such as the ones known by the reports named after their chairmen, Rampton (1981) and Swann (1985), later becoming Deputy Chair and Acting Chair of the Commission for Racial Equality. Through both such public service and public interventions Parekh has influenced considerably the way in which citizens, intellectuals and policy makers have come to think about and understand racial equality and multiculturalism in Britain and further afield. Parekh was most significant for instance in articulating, stimulating and leading a multiculturalist position at the time of the *Satanic Verses* affair. He was later the Chair of the Commission of Multi-ethnic Britain, which produced what is known as the Parekh Report, one of the most important public documents in its field, and just before its publication in 2000 Parekh was made a Labour member of the House of Lords, a position he continues to serve with distinction. (Parekh has also played a role in Indian public life but I write here of what I have personally observed.)

Second, Parekh's career in political philosophy and as a public intellectual (in challenging orthodoxies, leading new debates and pointing to new conceptions of who we were as a public and as a country) has been as an ethnic minority individual, as a British Asian. This has given him a direct insight into the things that are theorised in this book, meaning that he can speak with some authenticity and authority on the nature and desirability of

PREFACE

multiculturalism, but it has also meant an uphill climb to be heard and to be taken seriously, especially in public affairs.

As a political philosopher, a public intellectual and a British Asian he has been a guide and an inspiration to many. While this book is primarily an engagement in political philosophy, each of these elements has played a part in motivating the contributors to this book to be part of this collection.

List of Contributors

Benjamin R. Barber is Senior Research Scholar at the Graduate Center, City University of New York, and founder and President of the Interdependence Movement. He is Walt Whitman Professor of Political Science Emeritus at Rutgers University. His latest book, *If Mayors Ruled the World: Dysfunctional Nations, Rising Cities* (2013), already in ten foreign editions, has engendered a project to establish a Global Parliament of Mayors, whose first sitting will occur in London in late 2015. Among Barber's eighteen books are the classic *Strong Democracy* (1984), the international bestseller *Jihad vs. McWorld* (1996), and the critique of consumerist materialism and push marketing *Consumed* (2004).

Rajeev Bhargava is Senior Fellow and Director, Centre for the Study of Developing Societies, Delhi. He has held visiting fellowships at Harvard, Columbia, Jerusalem, Bristol and Paris. He is on the advisory board of several institutions and programmes and was a consultant to the UNDP report on cultural liberty. His publications include *Individualism in Social Science* (1992), *Secularism and its Critics* (edited volume 1998), *What is Political Theory and Why do We Need It?* (2010) and *The Promise of India's Secular Democracy* (2010).

Joseph H. Carens is Professor of Political Science at the University of Toronto. He published over seventy articles, edited two books, and written *The Ethics of Immigration* (2014), *Immigrants and*

LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS

the Right to Stay (2010), *Culture, Citizenship and Community: A Contextual Exploration of Justice as Evenhandedness* (2000) and *Equality, Moral Incentives, and the Market: An Essay in Utopian Politico-Economic Theory* (1981).

Andrew Gamble is Professor of Politics and a Fellow of Queen's College, University of Cambridge. He is joint editor of *The Political Quarterly* and a Fellow of the British Academy. He has published widely on British politics, public policy, and political economy. In 2005 he was awarded the PSA Isaiah Berlin prize for Lifetime Contribution to Political Studies. His books include *Between Europe and America: The Future of British Politics* (2003) and *The Spectre at the Feast: Capitalist Crisis and the Politics of Recession* (2009).

Peter Jones is Professor of Political Philosophy at the University of Newcastle. He is the author of *Rights* (1994) and editor of *National Rights, International Obligations* (1996), *Human Rights and Global Diversity* (2001) and *Group Rights* (2009). Most of his published work has appeared in academic journals and edited collections and ranges over a variety of subjects, including cultural diversity, toleration, recognition, freedom of belief and expression, value pluralism, political equality, distributive justice, global justice, democracy and liberalism.

Paul Kelly is Pro-director and Professor of Political Theory at the London School of Economics. He is author, editor and co-editor of fourteen books, including *Utilitarianism and Distributive Justice* (1990), *Liberalism* (2004), *Locke's Second Treatise* (2007) and *British Political Theory in the Twentieth Century* (2010). He was joint editor of *Political Studies* (1999–2005) and editor of *Utilitas* (2006–11).

Will Kymlicka is the Canada Research Chair in Political Philosophy at Queen's University in Kingston, Canada, where he has taught since 1998. His research focuses on issues of democracy and diversity, and in particular on models of citizenship and social justice within multicultural societies. He is the author

LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS

of seven books published by Oxford University Press, including *Liberalism, Community, and Culture* (1989), *Multicultural Citizenship* (1995), *Multicultural Odysseys* (2007), and *Zoopolis: A Political Theory of Animal Rights* (2011, co-authored with Sue Donaldson).

Tariq Modood is Professor of Sociology, Politics and Public Policy at the University of Bristol and is also the founding Director of the Centre for the Study of Ethnicity and Citizenship. His latest books include *Multiculturalism: A Civic Idea* (second edition 2013), *Still Not Easy Being British* (2010); and he co-edited *European Multiculturalisms* (2012), *Tolerance, Intolerance and Respect* (2013) and *Religion in a Liberal State* (2013). He is a regular contributor to the media and policy debates in Britain. His website is www.tariqmodood.com.

Monica Mookherjee is a Senior Lecturer in Political Philosophy at Keele University, UK. Her main research interests lie in feminism, multiculturalism, human rights and the politics of recognition. Her monograph, *Women's Rights as a Multicultural Claims: Reconfiguring Gender and Diversity in Political Philosophy* (2009), explores the tensions between feminism and multiculturalism in contemporary political theory. She edited the volume *Democracy, Religious Pluralism and the Liberal Dilemma of Accommodation* (2010). She has also written journal articles for *Res Publica*, *Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy* and *Feminist Theory*.

Thomas Pantham, born in Kerala, is a former Professor of Political Science at the Maharaja Sayajirao University of Baroda, Vadodara. He has been recipient of a Mahatma Gandhi National Fellowship of the Indian Council of Social Science Research, the Visitor's Nominee for social sciences at Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, and visiting scholar at St John's College, Cambridge, and Princeton University. His publications include *Political Theories and Social Reconstruction: A Critical Survey of the Literature on India* (1995), and *Political Ideas in Modern India: Thematic Explorations* (co-editor with V. R. Mehta, 2006).

LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS

Raymond Plant is Professor of Jurisprudence and Philosophy at the Dickson Poon School of Law at King's College London, and Professor in the same field in the University of Tallinn. He is also a Professor of Humanities at Winchester University and Gresham Professor of Divinity at Gresham College in the City of London. He is the author of eight books in these fields, the most recent being *The Neoliberal State* (2010). In 2008 he was Vincent Wright Professor at Sciences Po and he has frequently taught there since. He has been a member of the House of Lords since 1992.

Charles Taylor is professor emeritus of philosophy at McGill University. His writings include *Hegel* (1975); *Hegel and Modern Society* (1979); *Social Theory as Practice* (1983); *Human Agency and Language* (1985); *Philosophy and the Human Sciences* (1985); *Source of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity* (1989); *The Malaise of Modernity* (1991, based on the Massey Lectures for the CBC held in 1991); *Reconciling the Solitudes: Essays on Canadian Federalism and Nationalism* (1993); *Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of Recognition*, (1994); *Philosophical Arguments* (1995); *A Secular Age* (2007).

Varun Uberoi is Lecturer in Political Theory and Public Policy at Brunel University. His research has been published in *Political Studies*, *Parliamentary Affairs*, *Political Quarterly* and the *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*. He co-edited *Options for a New Britain* (2009) and *Options for Britain II* (2010). His next book, *Nation-Building Through Multiculturalism*, will be published in 2016.

Introduction – Parekhian Multiculturalism

Varun Uberoi

What are sometimes called ‘political theories of multiculturalism’ have a complex philosophical and political history.¹ They emerged only after forms of identity politics spread in different countries, along with the intuition that different types of cultural minorities deserve better treatment than they often receive.² Political theorists made sense of this intuition in different ways, hence some showed why much of what cultural minorities strive for is compatible with liberal theories of justice.³ Others claimed such liberal theories of justice focus on distribution when they should focus on the domination and oppression that cultural minorities face.⁴ Yet others ventured beyond theories of justice to note how people need parents, partners and close friends to accept, affirm and respect how they see themselves, which must come from within to be ‘authentic’;⁵ but minorities often internalise inauthentic understandings of themselves as inferiors.⁶ Similarly, Bhikhu Parekh in *Rethinking Multiculturalism (RM)*⁷ ventured beyond theories of justice and did so in a way that was immediately noted by authors of alternative approaches to be highly significant. *RM* was said to justify intercultural dialogue in a unique way and could explain, unlike other theories, why cultural diversity is valuable.⁸ It was said to avoid ‘privileging’ liberalism and justice over other ideals;⁹ it tackled many hard cases; was ‘profound, original and wide-ranging’.¹⁰ As a result of *RM*, some claim Parekh is ‘among the greatest figures’ in contemporary British political theory¹¹ while others claim he has influenced how we think about politics.¹²

Many thus study Parekh's work.¹³ And even those outside the academy who criticise Parekh note how *RM* influenced them and how it should influence others too.¹⁴

RM was thus significant and this volume continues the project that *RM* began by first helping to fill a gap. Sustained examinations of parts of *RM*¹⁵ do not explore *why* and *how* Parekh offers the theory that he does¹⁶ so I will do so in this introduction. I provide a new way to think about *RM*, its prominent critics and its themes. Subsequent chapters then explore the intellectual history of some of *RM*'s themes, use such themes to explore contemporary dilemmas in multicultural societies and develop these themes in wholly new directions.

I explore why Parekh offers the theory that he does by briefly examining where his philosophical approach and aims in *RM* come from and how Parekh offers the theory he does by examining the nature and structure of *RM*. I then show how subsequent chapters make use of many of the themes of *RM* that I discuss.

The intellectual origins of RM

Others show how Michael Oakeshott's *Rationalism in Politics* influenced his former student, Bhikhu Parekh.¹⁷ But *RM* was also shaped by Oakeshott's early understanding of philosophy in *Experience and its Modes* which is complex. Yet briefly, Oakeshott argued that scholarly enquiries like history or science are 'worlds of ideas'¹⁸ that remain 'abstract' until we examine and relate the presuppositions on which they rest. Thus we might explore how history presupposes conceptions of time and change, or how science presupposes conceptions of regularity and prediction; and philosophy does just this. Philosophy removes abstraction by examining and relating all such presuppositions to present 'a unity of valid . . . and *irreducible*' ideas.¹⁹ When presuppositions are examined and related they are no longer presupposed thus philosophy is ideally 'presuppositionless' enquiry.²⁰ Parekh endorsed such a view of philosophy even when discussing alternatives from Marx and Arendt.²¹ Hence in the year *RM* was published, Parekh argued 'whatever else it may be, philosophy is a relentless . . . search for full self-consciousness, a determined

attempt to uncover and critically examine all its own basic assumptions . . .'.²²

Note, however, that *RM* is no example of early Oakeshottian *political* philosophy which, at the time, Oakeshott called 'pseudo-philosophy'.²³ 'Pseudo-philosophy' retains abstraction and Oakeshott used Ethics as an example as it seldom examined how values presuppose understandings of 'morality', 'good', 'right', of 'ought' and 'is'. Similarly, political philosophy seldom avoids abstraction by 'thinking out *to the end*'²⁴ political life and how, for example, it presupposes human life, life and existence, thus moving *away* from politics which is a 'starting place'²⁵ 'soon out of sight and out of mind'.²⁶ Parekh disagreed as he saw how a political philosopher might instead minimise his presuppositions and work in the opposite direction to Oakeshott by moving gradually *towards* political life. For example, a political philosopher might examine the nature of human life and why it is usually shared with many others, why doing so requires a system of authority in which loyalty, obligation, liberty and so on are conceived and related in ways that legitimise some institutions, but not others. This gradually shapes the 'framework' of our 'thought',²⁷ 'choices'²⁸ and 'recommendations'²⁹ for political life and this is the approach to political philosophy that Parekh used in *RM*.

This approach is *not* presuppositionless but it entails a more limited range of presuppositions about, for example, how human life presupposes life or existence and a means to conceptualise both. Exploring all presuppositions on the way to exploring political life may mean never getting to the latter. But a philosopher can be aware that his arguments remain, as Oakeshott later said, 'conditional' and still approximate³⁰ to the ideal of being 'presuppositionless' by *minimising* his presuppositions and Parekh tried to do just this in *RM*.

Parekh would thus avoid the unquestioned assumptions of other political theories of multiculturalism. For example, Will Kymlicka claims that 'individuals . . . are the ultimate units of moral worth'.³¹ But this assumes unspecified understandings of human life, moral worth and a way to justify a hierarchy of moral worth. It also assumes reasons for when, why and how to think

of people as individuals as we cannot always do so as they may be dependent children or parents and people use languages and traditions of thought that unavoidably assume and relate them to others.³² Similarly, Iris Young claimed that ‘justice is the primary subject of political philosophy’.³³ But this assumes an unspecified understanding of political philosophy and its various subjects as well as reasons to organise these subjects into a hierarchy in which justice can be plausibly placed in primary position at the top of this hierarchy and other subjects can be plausibly placed beneath it. As Parekh sought to minimise his presuppositions, he avoided these familiar unexplored assumptions and his aims for *RM* did not require them.³⁴

Such aims grew out of exposure to a caste system, untouchability and discrimination, which meant that Parekh saw inequality at ‘close quarters’.³⁵ This bred a lifelong fascination for the idea that inequality assumes and that is needed to detect inequality: *equality*. Some liken equality to sameness or uniformity but Parekh’s background made it difficult to ignore how *differences* make equality necessary. Parekh thus wrote in 1974 that an ‘Indian in England’ is ‘haunted’ by self-consciousness of their differences as these are misunderstood, feared, and are the source of his discrimination and exclusion.³⁶ In the same book Parekh thus said that such differences can be normalised in countries like Britain if British people ‘redefine’³⁷ themselves as culturally and racially diverse, but in time Parekh saw how differences could be valued too. He studied and critiqued Gandhi’s political thought and learned about how Gandhi saw India as ‘a community of communities’³⁸ that is not just ‘plural’ but ‘pluralist’, as Indians are often ‘committed to pluralism as a desirable value’.³⁹ Parekh’s interests in equality had led to an interest in which human differences to value, when, why and how to do so.

Thus by the time Parekh was writing *RM*, he wanted to show why Britain and any culturally diverse polity could be ‘a community of communities’⁴⁰ that is not just ‘multicultural’ but ‘multiculturalist’.⁴¹ Parekh aimed to show why and how the culturally diverse citizens of modern polities should value and welcome, not fear, their cultural differences. He would start to achieve this aim in *RM* by minimising his presuppositions to discuss ways of con-

ceiving human life that conflict with his own way of conceiving it by suggesting that ‘only one way of life is fully human and best’.⁴²

The nature and structure of RM

Parekh calls the view that only one way of life is fully human and best, ‘monism’, which is a term he borrows from Isaiah Berlin but uses differently.⁴³ As different forms of monism may conflict with the way that Parekh conceives of human life in different ways, he critiques classical, Christian and early liberal forms of monism in too many ways to discuss here.⁴⁴ But Parekh notes how the human capacity to contemplate, improve, follow God and much else, have long been used to privilege a way of life as ‘fully human’. This assumes an understanding of what it means to be human. Hence understandings of human nature are often offered by monists and Parekh showed why these are often derived from the way of life that monists justify and thus their arguments become circular. In such ways Parekh discussed the fragility of monist arguments and moved on to pluralist thinkers like Vico, Montesquieu and Herder who he showed valued the plurality of human life but made other mistakes.

Such pluralists were shown by Parekh to see how our cultures shape how human needs, behaviour and indeed lives are understood. But these thinkers implausibly conceive of culture as a national, organic and as an unchanging, integrated whole, disassociated from legal, political and economic structures.⁴⁵ At best, such pluralists show why national and not any other cultures should be valued. But contemporary liberals like Kymlicka and Raz had an important insight. They offer understandings of culture that many question but they build on the earlier works of others⁴⁶ to observe how cultures are linked to individual autonomy as the latter assumes choice, but people need something to choose with, which is the beliefs and norms of their culture. This observation is new, but it shows why individuals need a culture while ignoring what individuals can learn from other cultures and it does *not* show why a person who unquestioningly lives a life of *faith* should have access to any culture! Despite identifying such difficulties Parekh learned much from all these thinkers and says

so, and devised a position about human life that seems to begin by thinking about human nature.⁴⁷

For Parekh, human nature is merely those properties that people have that are not socially derived and that they possess by belonging to a species.⁴⁸ But as our *understandings* of human nature are derived partly from our cultural, social and other experiences, we have no direct access to human nature. There is no 'state of nature' where human nature appears in a pure form, thus claims that it 'inclines' or 'compels' seem suspect as they can universalise the way only *some* conceive of human beings, and must be avoided. Yet the idea of human nature is also not easy to reject without arriving at the bizarre conclusion that members of the same species have nothing in common. Indeed, human beings share a physiological and psychological structure, certain capacities to think and express themselves, as well as certain needs to eat and sleep and certain experiences like maturing or getting old.⁴⁹ Those without such properties are thought the exception not the rule and in this minimal sense, these properties comprise human nature, but are interpreted and prioritised differently in different cultures. The latter are patterns of beliefs, and thus meaning, as well as traditions of behaviour, and while Ann Phillips,⁵⁰ Seyla Benhabib⁵¹ and others rightly worry about essentialist conceptions of culture, Parekh explicitly avoids them.⁵² He shows why cultures have 'no coordinating authority',⁵³ 'remain complex and un-systematised',⁵⁴ 'internally varied' and speak 'in several voices',⁵⁵ are 'never settled, static and free of ambiguity'⁵⁶ and have 'no essence'.⁵⁷ Cultures are fuzzy but discernible. They help people to conceptualise and interpret their own natures, capacities and experiences, and this makes it strange to suggest, as Charles Taylor famously showed, that any culture could have no worth.⁵⁸

But 'thanks to human creativity, geographical conditions', and 'different historical experiences',⁵⁹ different cultures adopt different systems of meaning. They thus differ and help some to think that the good life is lived 'from within' and is self-chosen, others to believe it is about following God, yet others, that it is about adhering to nature's limits, and so on. Certain cultures thus favour certain forms of life over others and use certain ideas and judgements of worth, or values, to defend them. But as values and

different types of lives conflict, no culture can realise all of them. Each expresses and legitimises a limited range of values and ways to live, but is silent about or delegitimises others. Each culture is thus, in Oakeshottian language, a ‘world of ideas’, but need not be, as Oakeshott thought, closed to other such worlds. Indeed, just as Parekh once likened ideologies that give people a restricted view of the world to Oakeshott’s ‘worlds of ideas’ but noted how such restricted views can be overcome, he would do the same with cultures.⁶⁰ As worlds of ideas, cultures benefit from exposure to other cultures that illustrate different ways to live, think, realise values and satisfy needs. In doing so, a cultural group is alerted to the limits of their ideas and the potential of those of others. Cultural diversity should thus be valued not as Herder, Mill and others thought for being unavoidable, natural, or leading to experiments in living, as these are not reasons to value anything. Instead cultural diversity should be valued as a prerequisite for the intercultural learning that enables what Gandhi called ‘a richer view’ of ‘reality’.⁶¹

Parekh thus saw what some call the danger ‘of *denying* . . . the chance to cross cultural borders’⁶² or ‘placing’ cultures ‘beyond the reach of critical analyses’.⁶³ Hence he notes what can be gained through intercultural learning, but the latter requires intercultural dialogue and Parekh seemingly thought such dialogue was important at four related levels, the first of which is *personal*. Parekh *seems* to accept Taylor’s claim that our self-understandings are formed through ‘webs of interlocution’ with others like parents, partners and close friends.⁶⁴ We need others to respect, confirm or confute how we understand ourselves and if these others are culturally different, they see us and can help us to see ourselves in different ways. Parekh thus admires the ‘idea of critical engagement’ with those who are culturally different and reshaping one’s ideas, beliefs, actions and thus oneself accordingly, and called Gandhi an ‘icon’ for doing this.⁶⁵ Gandhi ‘freely borrowed what was valuable in other religions and civilisations’ and thought this was possible for each religious person to do by first developing knowledge of their religion so as to then discern how it could be improved.⁶⁶ While people should certainly not be coerced into intercultural dialogue, it offers them what scholars

who disagree with one another experience as through their discussions and through reading one another's work they see their own ideas through the eyes of others. They in turn see what should be reformed, and why, and Parekh suggests that many can benefit from such a process.⁶⁷

People are also part of cultural communities, and the second level at which such intercultural dialogue is important is *communal*. For example, some minorities may have lower expectations for girls, treat them only as wives or mothers in the making. But through dialogue they can discern why many value gender equality and adapt their practices. Yet cultural majorities may also learn something about the restricted way in which they often interpret gender equality when, for example, Muslim women explain why they might *choose* to wear a *niqab* against the wishes of their fathers, brothers and husbands, and do not see it as a sign of domination any more than they see a 'mini-skirt as a sign of liberation'.⁶⁸ Intercultural dialogue introduces communities to the limits of their beliefs and practices and helps to illuminate the need to reform them. This for Parekh is a sign, again following Gandhi, not of betraying one's cultural community or undervaluing its history or intellectual resources. Instead it is a sign of cherishing one's community so much that being blind to its limitations is a form of negligence. All groups in a polity should be 'rooted and open'.⁶⁹

At a third level that may be thought of as 'societal', intercultural dialogue can alter the values that govern the collective affairs of all those in a polity and that are inscribed in its constitution, laws and norms. Parekh calls these 'operative public values' (OPVs), and they usually come from the culture of a dominant majority whose history they reflect and whose needs they suit most. Such OPVs are never static, and through intercultural dialogue they can come to reflect cultural minorities too. Indeed, this seemed to happen gradually in Britain after debates about whether Salman Rushdie's book, *The Satanic Verses*, should be banned, carry a disclaimer about its portrayal of Islam, not be released in paperback and so on. Minority intellectuals, including Parekh, explored the nature and limits of freedom of expression, and noted that such freedom had never been unfettered in societies like Britain. If it

had been, blasphemy, incitement to hatred and libel laws would be inexplicable. Likewise, they noted that it was unclear why existing blasphemy laws could not be extended to Muslims or why, if British libel laws exist to prevent public untruthful comments about people, they should not be extended to the groups people comprise. Regardless of the plausibility of these arguments, these arguments each extend *existing* practices that come from *within* the political tradition of the majority to minorities. This deepens our knowledge of the potential of such a tradition, shows how accommodating minority needs can be consistent with it and thus enables minorities to leave their imprint on OPVs, which is what seemed to occur. Thus during the Danish Cartoon Affair, British newspapers, including tabloids like the *Sun*, chose not to reprint offensive cartoons.⁷⁰ Parekh thus showed how what Oakeshott⁷¹ called the ‘intimations’ of a political tradition can be interpreted in different ways and the advantages of discussing such interpretations, not assuming or asserting them.⁷²

At a final level, intercultural dialogue is a means to ‘arrive’ at *universal* moral values that *may* be part of the OPVs of a polity in its constitution, for example, but are so, as the point above suggests, for reasons particular to that polity. But if universal moral values are what we think *all* humans, everywhere should accord moral worth to, their nature and history within a polity may or may not resonate with others or justify to them why *they* should value them too. For example, the UN Declaration on human rights lists property rights as a human right, but some indigenous groups and communists may disagree.⁷³ The nature and basis of universal moral values is therefore contested and cannot be derived from some notion of human worth. Thus we might claim humans have worth because they can think, reason, forge visions of the good in ways that other species cannot, therefore, we should all value their right to life. But when life ‘begins and ends’, and whether this right can be waived by the ‘terminally ill’, are seen differently in different religious and national communities.⁷⁴ ‘Procedural devices’ like Rawls’ ‘veil of ignorance’ do not help either, as people construe life, humanity, reason itself, and the various means of relating them differently and even if people *should* reason about values as Rawls suggests, this does not mean

they will do so.⁷⁵ There is a need to ‘woo the assent’ of others on how universal values should be understood and why they should be cherished, which requires dialogue. Thus Parekh suggests that the 1948 UN Declaration of Human Rights contains *some* values that have a claim to universality and it is a good ‘starting point’ for future discussion.⁷⁶

But, at the personal level, as Gandhi saw, people need to know enough about their cultures to know what can be added and absorbed easily and what will take time to acquire and reform.⁷⁷ People should be willing to learn about their own cultures, but also feel secure enough to welcome and discuss what they can learn from other ones. If then politicians, the police or the media depict some communities as ‘suspect’, as often happens with Muslims,⁷⁸ or as ‘backward’ as many like J. S. Mill did, or not ready for ‘self-rule’, this can have a cost.⁷⁹ It can help to cultivate closed communities as rather like with wartime coalitions, *internal* discussions must be suspended to cope with an *external* threat and the same is true of a cultural majority, who feel their way of life is disappearing. The intercultural learning that requires intercultural dialogue thus requires a political structure that legitimises differences, so that people are not afraid to explore their own and are secure enough to learn from, and not feel threatened by, those of others. But not feeling threatened by the differences of others also requires a political structure that can foster the unity needed for differences to not *seem* divisive or destabilising. Thus Parekh identifies ‘devices’ to legitimise differences and foster unity that include ‘equal treatment’ and national identities, both of which I will now discuss.

Many focus on Parekh’s notion of equal *opportunity*.⁸⁰ Yet Parekh justifies equal *treatment* in an original way when he recalibrates how it is usually justified by canonical thinkers like Aristotle and more recent ones like Isaiah Berlin and Bernard Williams. Such thinkers argue that human beings are often thought equal as they are also thought to be, fundamentally, the same.⁸¹ Hence, using human uniformities such as their physiological and psychological structure and their needs, human beings are said to be the same or similar and must be treated as such, as ‘similar cases should be treated similarly’ or reasons given why not to.⁸² As human beings

are the same, they must then have the same fundamental legal and political requirements or need the same protections. Equal treatment thus predictably safeguards the human uniformities its justification is based on and entails same or similar treatment, but this can favour some cultural groups while imposing higher costs on others. For example, if children are treated the same in public schools that ban religious headdresses, or if a school uniform mandates a cap, this favours those who have no need for a religious headdress. Yet *yarmulke*, turban or *hijab* wearing children incur a cost that others do not when they compromise a religious belief or practice to attend such schools. Critics of Parekh, like Brian Barry, claim ‘this is just how things are’,⁸³ but David Miller rightly asks why people are being treated the same or similarly if some are favoured while others incur higher costs.⁸⁴ Miller thus suggests there is a problem, but it is Parekh who identifies its cause.

Parekh thus notes what happens when justifications for equal treatment appeal to human uniformities but ignore one such uniformity: that humans are ‘cultural beings’.⁸⁵ As cultural beings, humans are the same in a way that makes them different as they interpret their physiological and psychological structure as well as their needs through their cultures, such that in one culture sex can be a biological need akin to, as Bentham claimed, ‘scratching an itch’ and in another it is sacrosanct. To justify equal treatment through fundamental human uniformities, while ignoring the one uniformity that helps people to understand their other ones, is to be inconsistent. But to include this uniformity with the others entails accepting how human beings are both the same *and different*, and thus they have the same *and different* legal and political requirements, or need the same *and different protections*. To ignore the latter is to ignore necessary requirements or protections, which in the case above resulted in some being favoured while others incurred higher costs. But taking account of how people *also* have *different* legal and political requirements and need different protections requires the children in the above case to be treated differently and given exemptions to wear their religious headdress to ensure they do not incur higher costs and thus unequal treatment. Parekh thus showed how *if* a justifica-

tion for equal treatment excludes how humans are ‘cultural beings’, our understanding of equal treatment becomes narrow and unable to address the difficulties with treating people the same. But including how humans are cultural beings in our justification of equal treatment expands our understanding of such treatment to help ensure that cultural minorities do not incur higher costs and differences like religious headdress thus become more legitimate in places like schools.

This is admittedly an ‘easy case’, in which those wearing a religious headdress are *not* being privileged as they are merely avoiding higher costs than others. Thus students who want to wear a baseball cap or a bandana to school cannot plausibly complain that they are being treated unequally unless they, their parents or we can plausibly think such a cap and bandana stems from a cultural difference that, as above, helps to condition how they see parts of their life.⁸⁶ In other ‘harder cases’, however, as Parekh notes, other conceptions of equality and other values may have to be considered.⁸⁷ Yet I do not focus on the harder cases here as I aim not to justify differential treatment, but to show how Parekh reconceptualised a traditional justification for equal treatment so as to show how it legitimises differences.⁸⁸ Indeed, just as anti-discrimination laws used equal treatment to help to legitimise racial differences, Parekh is showing how, at times, equal treatment can do the same with other such differences too. But the latter again occurs using the ‘intimations’ of a tradition of justifying equal treatment through uniformities, and showing the importance of not ignoring one such uniformity.

What about fostering ‘unity’? Parekh nowhere in *RM* says what unity is, but he often uses the term in one of three related ways, each of which helps to explain why the members of a polity form a group. First, ‘unity is located’ in a state’s ‘constitutionally prescribed structure of authority’ as the state and its laws and institutions govern members of a polity as a group.⁸⁹ Second, those governed by the state as a group over time can come to see themselves as a group, hence some national minorities fear they will be subsumed, as a common legal, political, educational system and a common language increase the likelihood of this.⁹⁰ Third, when the members of a polity see themselves as a group, ‘bonds’ emerge

between them like a ‘mutual concern’ or ‘common loyalty’ to one another. The unity of a polity thus comes *externally* from the state, *internally* from its members and from the relations *between* them. And people’s national identities are thought to *help* to foster such three-dimensional unity as if the members of a polity feel, for example, ‘British’ or ‘American’ then, *inter alia*, they feel part of such a group which then encourages the bonds of group membership.

Yet people cannot say they feel ‘British’ or ‘American’ without some ‘conception’ of what Britain and America are, even if it is vague.⁹¹ If this ‘conception’ entails people sharing an ethnicity or a culture, ‘ethno-cultural’ minorities can be, and often are, excluded. Thus Parekh thought that polities should be ‘defined’ in ‘politico-institutional’ terms instead.⁹² Hence, if America is ‘defined’ using its constitution and bill of rights then it can be understood according to its political structures and institutions. The latter usually reflect a cultural majority’s history, language, norms and values. But such political institutions and structures are shared by a cultural majority and minorities alike and can be used to promote conceptions of the polity that include ethno-cultural minorities by declaring the polity multicultural, as Canada and Australia did.⁹³ These institutions and structures are part of a polity’s structure of authority and govern its members as a group, but Parekh wanted these institutions and structures to also constitute people’s ‘conceptions’ of themselves as a group.⁹⁴ Contrary then to what Barry claims, multiculturalists can attach importance to the ‘civic’ national identities⁹⁵ that he himself endorses.⁹⁶ But scholars sympathetic to Parekh offered a more plausible criticism.

Hence, Tariq Modood asked how a ‘conception’ of a polity that is only ‘politico-institutional’ – not ‘ethno-cultural’ – could include ‘ethno-cultural’ minority groups within it.⁹⁷ Also political institutions and structures can only constitute how people view their polity because these institutions and structures are also a product of their history, language, norms and so on. Were they just any institutions and structures, they would be less meaningful. People don’t have conceptions of their polities that are purely ‘politico-institutional’, and Parekh should not want them to if

he wants to include ethno-cultural minorities in them; hence this claim is gradually lost in Parekh's subsequent works. But *RM* had the resources to identify the more plausible understanding of national identities that Parekh discussed in later works like *A New Politics of Identity*.⁹⁸

Parekh would thus later identify *two* familiar but previously *undistinguished* ways of thinking about national identities, between which he and others had unconsciously moved. In doing so, he clarified his claims in *RM* where he was not only discussing how a person might have a national identity that they exhibit when they feel, for example, British or American. He also discussed how political structures and institutions 'define' a polity which we thus may also think has an identity.⁹⁹ After all, just as we might think that a 'city' has an identity as certain features define it and distinguish it, enable us to discern that London is not New York, so we might think a polity has an identity as certain features define it, distinguish it, enable us to discern that Britain is not America.¹⁰⁰ Where some think of national identities as the institutions, history, language, values and other features that, for example, make Britain or America what they are, others think national identities are one of many identities that a person has and exhibits when they say they feel British or American.

Yet when discussing Britain or America's identity we are discussing a conception of a polity and as we saw before, when someone says they feel British or American they indicate that they must have some conception of what Britain or America are, even if it is vague. In both senses then, national identities entail a conception of a polity. But one is a conception of a polity that anyone can have, as a travel writer might discuss the features that define and distinguish Britain and America. The other is a conception that usually only members of a polity have and indicate the presence of when they say that they have a British or an American identity or that they feel British and American.

But when the conception of a polity that members have only includes a cultural majority, as phrases like the 'naturally British' suggest, Parekh notes a problem. Such conceptions can reduce the unity that we saw was important as even though all citizens are governed as a group the cultural majority do not see minorities as

part of it. This often increases fear of minorities and discrimination against them thus minorities can come to feel like outsiders even though they are often citizens. But members of a polity can develop more inclusive conceptions of it as these conceptions change over time, but how might this happen?

Note what occurs over time when political institutions that once permitted discrimination and exclusion come to prohibit both, declare the polity multicultural, deliver public services in different languages and promote race equality. Such institutions are promoting a conception of the polity that includes minorities but over time members of a polity also come to realise that while discrimination and exclusion were once permissible they no longer are. This realisation can only occur if people's conceptions of their polity have altered and 'multicultural education' in schools aids this too. It explains to children why immigrants and national minorities also shape a polity's history, institutions and norms in ways that were previously often ignored. Thus the sorts of government measures that Parekh had long defended for many other reasons¹⁰¹ may also aid the members of a polity to have more inclusive conceptions of it and note how these measures collectively comprise what is often called a policy of multiculturalism.¹⁰² The policies that public intellectuals like David Goodhart¹⁰³ or prominent scholars like David Miller assume are about minority identities not national ones,¹⁰⁴ may aid the emergence of the inclusive conceptions of a polity that they also seek.¹⁰⁵ Members of a polity with these conceptions of it will see minorities as part of their polity and develop the bonds that we saw accompany people seeing one another as, *inter alia*, part of the same group. Despite its problems, *RM* thus contained the basis of showing how national identities can include minorities so as to legitimise differences while promoting unity as we saw Parekh wanted.

RM is thus best conceived as an attempt to show why and how the culturally diverse people who comprise modern polities should see themselves as diverse, welcome and value their diversity, not fear it and certain steps are taken to achieve this. To be as free of presuppositions as possible Parekh first disturbs monist ways of thinking about human life to replace them with another

way of thinking about it and its relation to culture, the value of culture, cultural diversity and intercultural learning. Such learning requires intercultural dialogue and a political structure that uses, *inter alia*, equal treatment to legitimise diversity and national identities to foster three-dimensional unity. No volume can devote chapters to all the themes in these steps, but what can be done is to take some of them and request leading political theorists to explore their intellectual history, to use them to address contemporary multicultural dilemmas and to develop these themes in wholly new directions. I will conclude this chapter by showing how the subsequent chapters in the volume do just this.

Structure of the volume

The volume is divided into three sections and the chapters in the first one are interpretative as they improve our understanding of the patterns of thought from which the themes of *RM* emerge. Paul Kelly thus focuses on Parekh's idea of a 'community of communities', and shows how thinkers whom Parekh has not considered have utilised versions of the idea, if not the term. Hence J. N. Figgis focused on the relationship between religious authority and the state, while G. D. H. Cole advocated 'guild socialism'. Both Figgis and Cole thought a state was comprised and defined by groups, and both are potential unconscious influences on Parekh's thought. Where Kelly examines these and other potential *unconscious* influences, Thomas Pantham explores a *conscious* influence on Parekh. He traces where Parekh discerned the idea in Gandhi's thought of combining ideas from different cultural traditions to aid political reform. I then use many relatively unnoticed writings from Parekh since the 1970s to illuminate the nature of his distinct way of thinking about national identities that we see only glimpses of in *RM*. I show that Parekh avoids the difficulties of what has become known as liberal and conservative nationalist ways of thinking about national identities. I also show how Parekh's way of thinking about national identities can be of use to different types of scholars and politicians who discuss national identities too.

In the next section chapter authors focus on various themes in *RM* to elucidate current multicultural dilemmas while also identifying ways to address them. Monica Mookherjee explicitly uses the insights of Parekh's theory of culture and intercultural dialogue to illustrate why multiculturalism need not, as Susan Moller Okin and others have claimed, legitimise gendered hierarchies or group rights that disadvantage women. Indeed, Mookherjee shows how Parekh's theory helps us to see how to pluralise feminism and feminise multiculturalism. Peter Jones examines whether the idea of equality can be 'subject dependent', as Parekh claims. Jones considers whether the way Brian Barry criticises this claim from Parekh is plausible so as to probe the nature and limits of using equality to accommodate religious differences. Rajeev Bhargava then explores whether Parekh's theory is as hospitable to religious difference as Parekh thinks, and how it ignores the insights to be gained from the Indian experience of secularism which differs from others as there is no 'wall between church and state', as Jefferson thought there was in America, nor is there official 'establishment' of a faith as in the UK. In India the state interferes with religion when doing so promotes equality, freedom and other such values. Raymond Plant then examines Parekh's conception of identity, the political and legal claims that can flow from it and the basis of coercion in Parekh's political thought.

The third section examines themes integral to Parekh's thought from different perspectives to his which enables chapter authors to take these themes in new and different directions. Hence where Parekh, like many others, criticises essentialised understandings of culture; Will Kymlicka elegantly explores whether theories, policies or discourse about multiculturalism are vulnerable to this essentialist charge to discern if a corrective is needed and if so where. Joseph Carens shows why legitimising cultural differences entails much more than focusing on institutions, principles and rights; hence he examines how expectations, incentives and identities must be adapted to include minorities. Andrew Gamble extends Parekh's concern about national identity to show how anxieties about its loss and erosion have helped to generate various public controversies that theorists like Parekh have

been involved in. Benjamin R. Barber shows why a ‘politico-institutional’ identity akin to the one Parekh identifies in *RM* can, if it takes a particular form, foster the unity that democracies require to take and enforce collectively binding decisions. Charles Taylor shows how Quebec’s policy of interculturalism suggests how to legitimise diversity in European nations while fostering unity in them too as Parekh suggests. Tariq Modood shows how such interculturalism helps to illuminate issues about cultural majorities that multiculturalists have somewhat neglected, but it differs little from what Modood, Parekh, I and others would call ‘multiculturalism’.

Each of the above chapters can hopefully be read both in isolation and with other chapters in its section. When read in isolation, a chapter offers insights particular to its author and his or her influences and concerns. When read with other chapters in its section, the section helps the reader to interpret and understand the intellectual history of some of *RM*’s themes or uses its themes to address current dilemmas or advances these themes in new directions.

Acknowledgements

I am grateful to Andrew Mason, Noel O’Sullivan, Bhikhu Parekh, Raymond Plant, Elise Rietveld and Jonathan Seglow for their comments. Tariq Modood deserves special thanks not only because he gave extended and invaluable comments on this chapter, but also because he has advised me over many years about how to interpret Bhikhu Parekh’s work and because he came up with the idea for this volume!

Notes

1. For a succinct and thoughtful overview of this philosophical and political history see W. Kymlicka’s (2007), ‘The new debate on minority rights (and postscript)’, in A. S. Laden and D. Owen (eds) *Multiculturalism and Political Theory* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), which has a useful addition (the postscript)

- to the earlier version that Kymlicka published in *Politics in the Vernacular*.
2. By ‘intuition’ I mean what Kymlicka calls a ‘gut feeling’ that is the basis of more considered judgement, which of course is still imprecise. For a detailed discussion of what intuitions are, see M. Oakeshott (1933), *Experience and its Modes* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), pp. 21–6; W. Kymlicka (2002), *Contemporary Political Philosophy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press), pp. 6–7. See also J. Rawls (1971), *Theory of Justice* (Oxford: Oxford University Press) for a discussion on ‘intuitionism’, pp. 34–40.
 3. W. Kymlicka (1989), *Liberalism, Community and Culture* (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
 4. I. M. Young (1990), *Justice and the Politics of Difference* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press).
 5. This obviously comes from Charles Taylor who is not necessarily an advocate of ‘authenticity’, but see C. Taylor (1991), *Ethics of Authenticity* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press), pp. 29, 47–8; C. Taylor (1998), *Sources of the Self* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), p. 88.
 6. C. Taylor (1994), ‘The politics of recognition’, in A. Gutman (ed.) *Multiculturalism* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press).
 7. Bhikhu Parekh (2000), *Rethinking Multiculturalism: Cultural Diversity and Political Theory* (London: Macmillan).
 8. I. M. Young (2001), ‘Thoughts on multicultural dialogue’, *Ethnicities*, 1:1, p. 117.
 9. C. Taylor (2001), ‘Multiculturalism and political identity’, *Ethnicities*, 1:1, p. 125.
 10. W. Kymlicka (2001), ‘Liberalism, dialogue and multiculturalism’, *Ethnicities*, 1:1, p. 129; T. Modood (2001), ‘Their liberalism our multiculturalism’, *British Journal of Politics and International Relations*, 3:2, p. 246.
 11. P. Kelly (2010), *British Tradition of Political Theory* (Oxford: Wiley Blackwell), p. x.
 12. T. Brooks (2013), ‘In defence of political theory: impact and opportunities’, *Political Studies Review*, 11:2, p. 208.
 13. P. Kelly (2001), ‘Dangerous liaisons, Parekh and Oakeshottian multiculturalism’, *Political Quarterly*, 72:4, explores them. See also J. Baggini and J. Strangroom (2007), *What More Philosophers Think* (London: Continuum); R. Jahanbegloo (2011), *Talking Politics* (Oxford: Oxford University Press); J. B. Priess (2011),

- ‘Multiculturalism and equal dignity – an essay on Bhikhu Parekh’, *Res publica*, 17:2.
14. D. Goodhart (2013), *The British Dream* (London: Atlantic Press), p. 208.
 15. P. Kelly (2009), ‘The Oakeshottians’, in M. Flinders, A. Gamble and C. Hay (eds) *The Oxford Handbook of British Politics* (Oxford: Oxford University Press); N. O’Sullivan (2004), *European Political Theory Since 1945*: Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan); Jahanbegeloo, *Talking Politics*; Priess, ‘Essay on Bhikhu Parekh’.
 16. Many note that Parekh is an expert on Bentham, Arendt, Marx and Gandhi’s political thought, that he was influenced by Michael Oakeshott, that he was a former Deputy Chair and acting Chair of the Commission for Race Equality, Chair of the Commission for Multi-ethnic Britain and that he sits in the House of Lords. But why and how these parts of Parekh’s CV shape RM is not self-evident.
 17. Paul Kelly was the first to make this observation, see Kelly, “‘Dangerous liaisons’” and ‘The Oakeshottians’.
 18. Oakeshott, *Experience and Its Modes*, pp. 322–3.
 19. *Ibid.*, p. 348.
 20. *Ibid.*, pp. 81–2, emphasis added; and M. Oakeshott (1946), ‘A philosophy of politics’, *Religion, Politics and the Moral Life* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press), p. 127. See also J. Alexander (2012), ‘Oakeshott as a philosopher’, in E. Podoksik (ed.) *The Cambridge Companion to Oakeshott* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), p. 13.
 21. B. Parekh (1968), ‘The nature of political philosophy’, in P. King and B. Parekh (eds) *Experience and Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), p. 156; B. Parekh (1982), *Marx’s Theory of Ideology* (London: Croom Helm), p. 231; B. Parekh (1982), *Contemporary Political Thinkers* (Oxford: Martin Robertson), p. 4; B. Parekh (2000), ‘Theorising political theory’, in N. O’Sullivan (ed.), *Political Theory In Transition* (London: Routledge), pp. 250–1.
 22. Parekh, ‘Theorising political theory’, pp. 250–1. Here I move from ‘presupposition’ to ‘assumption’ without questioning if they are the same thing but only because I think the two are often used by Parekh interchangeably and others also use both interchangeably. See J. Carens (2013), *Ethics of Immigration* (Oxford: Oxford University Press), p. 299.

23. Oakeshott, *Experience and Its Modes*, p. 335, fn 1. Oakeshott never fully rejected this view. Even in *On Human Conduct*, which was Oakeshott's last book, he recognises that the unconditional theorising that he seeks is not possible if political philosophy is to remain focused on political life, so it must remain 'conditional' and aware of its conditionality (pp. 10–18).
24. Oakeshott, 'A philosophy of politics', p. 131.
25. M. Oakeshott, 'Political philosophy', in *Religion, Politics and the Moral Life* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press), p. 146.
26. *Ibid.*, p. 153.
27. Jahanbegloo, *Talking Politics*, p. 40.
28. Parekh, *Contemporary Political Thinkers*, p. 117.
29. Parekh, 'The nature of political philosophy', p. 180.
30. M. Oakeshott (1975), *On Human Conduct* (Oxford: Clarendon), p. 11.
31. Kymlicka, *Liberalism, Community and Culture*, pp. 140, 162–3; W. Kymlicka (1995), *Multicultural Citizenship* (Oxford: Oxford University Press), pp. 75, 80. Parekh questions this liberal assumption in several places. See Parekh, *Marx's Theory of Ideology*, p. 40; B. Parekh (1989), *Gandhi's Political Philosophy* (London: Macmillan), p. 24; Parekh, 'Theorising political theory', p. 251.
32. B. Parekh (1976), 'Asians in Britain', *Five Views of Multiracial Britain* (London: Commission for Racial Equality), p. 44. B. Parekh (1992), 'The cultural particularity of liberal democracy', *Political Studies*, XL, p. 161. Note that RM is *not* an 'illiberal' or 'non-liberal' theory, and in it Parekh states its 'strong liberal orientation' (RM, p. 14).
33. Young, *Justice and Politics of Difference*, p. 3.
34. Note that many senior political philosophers now agree that political philosophy cannot remain only or primarily focused on justice, see for example, J. Waldron (2013), 'Political political theory – an inaugural lecture', *Journal of Political Philosophy*, 21:1, p. 6.
35. Jahanbegloo, *Talking Politics*, p. 128.
36. B. Parekh (1974), 'The spectre of self-consciousness', in *Colour, Culture Consciousness* (London: George Allen & Unwin), p. 81, emphasis added. Those who focus purely on Parekh's work on Bentham's idea of equality at this time will miss this point. See B. Parekh (1970), 'Bentham's theory of equality', *Political Studies*, 18:4.

37. B. Parekh (1974), 'Postscript', in B. Parekh (ed.) *Colour, Culture and Consciousness: Immigrant Intellectuals in Britain* (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd), p. 230, emphasis added. David Miller in *On Nationality* espouses something very similar but unlike Parekh in 1974 has a systematic theory to support his claims: D. Miller, *On Nationality* (Oxford: Oxford University Press), p. 181.
38. B. Parekh (1995), 'The ethno-centricity of nationalist discourse', *Nations and Nationalism*, 1:1, pp. 39–41.
39. Parekh, *Gandhi's Political Philosophy*, p. 39; see also p. 57.
40. Campaign for a Multi-ethnic Britain (CMEB) (2000), *Parekh Report* (London: Profile Books), p. 56; RM, p. 340.
41. RM, p. 6.
42. RM, pp. 1 and 16.
43. Berlin's depiction of monism is not just about illuminating value pluralism as it is also epistemic. Monism for Berlin is about claiming that each question has one and only one true answer. This is not how Parekh uses the term.
44. Some seem to think Parekh's aim is historical, but while he calls these chapters 'historical', his aim is clearly to critique the assumptions, internal logic and structure of monism. See F. Dallmyer (2003), 'Multiculturalism and the good life', *The Good Society*, 12:2, p. 41; RM, p. 10; B. Parekh (2003), 'A response', *The Good Society*, 12:2, p. 55.
45. RM, p. 78.
46. Kymlicka, *Liberalism, Community and Culture*, pp. 164–5; Kymlicka cites Dworkin extensively but earlier in the book discusses how Taylor too sees culture as a 'context of choice', p. 74. See also J. Raz (1994), 'Multiculturalism: a liberal perspective', *Dissent*, Winter, pp. 70–1.
47. RM, p. 114.
48. Ibid., p. 115.
49. Ibid., p. 116.
50. A. Phillips (2007), *Multiculturalism without Culture* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press), p. 14.
51. S. Benhabib, *The Claims of Culture* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002), p. 4.
52. RM, p. 144.
53. Ibid., p. 144.
54. Ibid., p. 144.
55. Ibid., p. 144.

56. Ibid., p. 148.
57. Ibid., p. 175.
58. Taylor, 'Politics of recognition', pp. 66, 72–3.
59. RM, pp.
60. Parekh, *Marx's Theory of Ideology*, p. 27.
61. Parekh *Gandhi's Political Philosophy*, p. 27.
62. Phillips, *Multiculturalism without Culture*, p. 14. Emphasis added.
63. Benhabib, *Claims of Culture*, p. 4.
64. Taylor, *Sources of The Self*, p. 82; RM, p. 342.
65. Jahanbegloo, *Talking Politics*, p. 128.
66. Parekh, *Gandhi's Political Philosophy*, p. 84.
67. RM, pp. 167–8.
68. Al Hibri (1999), 'Is Western patriarchal feminism good for Third World minority women', *Is Multiculturalism Bad For Women* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press), p. 46.
69. Parekh, *Gandhi's Political Philosophy*, p. 59. Emphasis added.
70. T. Modood (2006), 'The liberal dilemma: integration or vilification', *International Migration* 44:5, 4–7.
71. M. Oakeshott (1962), 'Political education', *Rationalism in Politics* (Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund), pp. 57 and 61.
72. Paul Kelly was the first to illustrate the Oakshottian nature of OPVs, and he elaborates this position in relation to Parekh's work in this volume.
73. B. Parekh (1992), 'The cultural particularity of liberal democracy', *Political Studies*, XL, p. 174.
74. Parekh, *Talking Politics*, p. 73.
75. B. Parekh (2008), *A New Politics of Identity* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan), p. 212; Jahanbegloo, *Talking Politics*, p. 73.
76. RM, pp. 308 and 133.
77. Parekh, *Gandhi's Political Philosophy*, p. 54.
78. V. Uberoi and T. Modood (2010), 'Who doesn't feel British? Divisions over Muslims', *Parliamentary Affairs*, 63:2.
79. J. S. Mill (1991), *Utilitarianism, Liberty, Representative Government* (Oxford: Oxford University Press), p. 431.
80. See Peter Jones' chapter; for other discussions see B. Barry (2001), *Culture and Equality* (Cambridge: Polity), p. 37; S. Caney (2002), 'Equal treatment, exceptions and cultural diversity', in P. Kelly (ed.) *Multiculturalism Reconsidered* (Cambridge: Polity), p. 88; J. Quong (2006), 'Cultural exemptions, expensive tastes and equal opportunities', *Journal of Applied Philosophy*, 23:1. p. 62.
81. RM, p. 239; B. Williams (2006), 'The idea of equality', in *In The*

- Beginning Was the Deed* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press), p. 97; and I. Berlin (1978), 'Equality', *Concepts and Categories* (London: Hogarth Press), p. 82.
82. Berlin, 'Equality', p. 82.
83. Barry, *Culture and Equality*, p. 34.
84. D. Miller (2002), 'Liberalism, equal opportunities and cultural commitments', in P. Kelly (ed.), *Multiculturalism Reconsidered* (Cambridge: Polity), p. 52.
85. *RM*, pp. 239–40.
86. Note how Barry's infamous motorcyclist who wants to ride a Harley Davidson without his helmet seemingly cannot make any of these claims. See Peter Jones' excellent treatment of this in this volume.
87. *RM*, pp. 261–3.
88. See Barry, 'Culture and Equality', p. 37; Caney, 'Equal treatment', p. 88; Quong, 'Cultural exemptions', p. 62.
89. B. Parekh (1986), 'The new right and the politics of nationhood', in N. Deakin (ed.), *The New Right Image and Reality* (London: Runnymede Trust), p. 39; B. Parekh (1999), 'The incoherence of nationalism', in R. Beiner (ed.) *Theorizing Nationalism* (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press), p. 323; and *RM*, p. 207.
90. *RM*, p. 196.
91. *RM*, p. 230.
92. *Ibid.*, pp. 231–2.
93. *Ibid.*, p. 235.
94. *Ibid.*, p. 230.
95. Barry, *Culture and Equality*, p. 77.
96. *Ibid.*, p. 80.
97. Modood, 'Their liberalism our multiculturalism', p. 249.
98. B. Parekh (2000), 'British national identity', *Political Quarterly*, p. 6; B. Parekh (2008), *A New Politics of Identity Political Principles for an Interdependent World* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan). In 'Being British', on p. 310, Parekh does suggest that common identity should be 'strictly political', yet by this he means that it should not be defined racially or ethnically.
99. *RM*, pp. 230–1.
100. Parekh, *A New Politics of Identity*, p. 59.
101. *Ibid.*, pp. 90–4.
102. Uberoi, 'Do policies change identities', pp. 406–7.
103. Goodhart, *British Dream*, p. 178.

104. D. Miller (2008), 'Immigrants, nations and citizenship', *Journal of Political Philosophy* 16:4, p. 380.
105. I develop this point at length in Uberoi, 'Do policies change identities'. See also my V. Uberoi (forthcoming, 2015), 'Legislating multiculturalism and nationhood', *Canadian Journal of Political Science*.