


# ADVENTURES IN TRANSCENDENTAL MATERIALISM

DIALOGUES WITH CONTEMPORARY THINKERS



ADRIAN JOHNSTON

## Speculative Realism

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# Adventures in Transcendental Materialism

Dialogues with Contemporary Thinkers

Adrian Johnston

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# Contents

<i>Acknowledgments</i>	vii
<i>Series Editor's Preface</i>	x
Introduction: Reports From Philosophical Fronts: Exchanges with Contemporaries Past and Present	i
 <b>Part I No Illusions: Hegel, Lacan, and Transcendental Materialism</b>	
1. The Latest System-Program of German Idealism: From Tübingen to Today	13
2. For a Thoughtful Ontology: Hegel's Immanent Critique of Spinoza	23
3. "Off with their thistleheads!": Against Neo-Spinozism	50
4. "Lacan, our Hegel": Psychoanalysis, Dialectics, and Materialisms	65
 <b>Part II Žižek: Dossier of an Ongoing Debate</b>	
5. Hegel's Luther: Žižek's Materialist Hegelianism	111
6. In Nature More Than Nature Itself: Žižek Between Naturalism and Supernaturalism	139
7. Spirit Is a Quark: Quantum Physics with Žižek	165

**Part III Transcendental Materialism's Significant Others: Psychoanalysis, Science, and Religion**

8.	Life Terminable and Interminable: Hägglund and the Afterlife of the Afterlife	187
9.	The true Thing is the (w)hole: Freudian-Lacanian Psychoanalysis and Hägglund's Chronolibidinal Reading	226
10.	Antiphilosophy and Paraphilosophy: Milner, Badiou, and Antiphilosophical Lacanianism	248
11.	The Real Unconscious: Malabou, Soler, and Psychical Life After Lacan	274
12.	Toward a Grand Neuropolitics: Why I am Not an Immanent Naturalist or Vital Materialist	295
	<i>Bibliography</i>	324
	<i>Index</i>	351

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the National Psychological Association for Psychoanalysis (2012); and, Chapter 12 as a keynote address at the Annual Philosophy Student Conference at the University of New Mexico on “Drive, Desire, and Dissent: Philosophy at the Intersection of Politics and Psychoanalysis” (2012). Not only am I deeply grateful for the invitations and hospitality extended to me by the individuals who had hands in arranging these gatherings – I benefitted enormously from the stimulating conversations and critical feedback I enjoyed during my visits to these places. I hope my revisions and additions to the contents of this book begin to do some justice to these exchanges.

Furthermore, I am grateful to the editors and publishers who graciously have permitted earlier articles and essays to reappear here in modified form. These earlier pieces are: “Slavoj Žižek’s Hegelian Reformation: Giving a Hearing to *The Parallax View*,” *Diacritics: A Review of Contemporary Criticism*, vol. 37, no. 1, Spring 2007, pp. 3–20 (Chapter 5); “Naturalism or Anti-naturalism? No, thanks – both are worse!': Science, Materialism, and Slavoj Žižek,” *La Revue Internationale de Philosophie*, no. 261, 2012, special issue: “On Slavoj Žižek,” pp. 321–46 (Chapter 6); “A Critique of Natural Economy: Quantum Physics with Žižek,” *Žižek Now*, ed. Jamil Khader and Molly Rothenberg, Cambridge: Polity Press, 2013, pp. 103–20 (Chapter 7); “Life Terminable and Interminable: The Undead and the Afterlife of the Afterlife – A Friendly Disagreement with Martin Hägglund,” *New Centennial Review*, vol. 9, no. 1, Spring 2009, special issue: “Living On: Of Martin Hägglund,” ed. David E. Johnson, pp. 147–89 (Chapter 8); “The true Thing is the (w)hole: Freudian-Lacanian Psychoanalysis and Derridean Chronolibidinal Reading – Another Friendly Reply to Martin Hägglund,” *Derrida Today*, 2013 (Chapter 9); “This Philosophy Which Is Not One: Jean-Claude Milner, Alain Badiou, and Lacanian Antiphilosophy,” *S: Journal of the Jan Van Eyck Circle for Lacanian Ideology Critique*, no. 3, Spring 2010, special issue: “On Jean-Claude Milner,” ed. Justin Clemens and Sigi Jöttkandt, pp. 137–58 (Chapter 10); “The Real Unconscious: A Friendly Reply to Catherine Malabou,” *Theory @ Buffalo*, no. 16, 2012, special issue: “*Plastique*: Dynamics of Catherine Malabou,” pp. 124–43 (Chapter 11); and, “Think Big: Toward a Grand Neuropolitics – or, Why I am not an immanent naturalist or vital materialist,” *Essays on Neuroscience and Political Theory: Thinking the Body Politic*, ed. Frank Vander

Valk, New York: Routledge, 2012, pp. 156–77 (Chapter 12). Furthermore, the editors and readers of these pieces helped me clarify and refine the ideas elaborated in them.

Finally, I am immeasurably indebted to my family for their unwavering love and care. Kathryn and our son Ezra mean everything and more to me. I also am extremely grateful to Kathryn's and my sets of parents (Jerry and Anne Wichelns and Tom and Trish Johnston) for their loving support and concern.

## Series Editor's Preface

Adrian Johnston is one of the most visible and influential younger figures in continental philosophy. With the present book, *Adventures in Transcendental Materialism*, his unique authorial voice resounds even more clearly than before. A trained Lacanian psychoanalyst and Professor of Philosophy at the University of New Mexico, Johnston is both a tireless writer and a charismatic public speaker. He is also the close collaborator of such European intellectual luminaries as Catherine Malabou and Slavoj Žižek. Johnston's work often has an almost magical effect on the young, who see in his combination of psychoanalysis, Leftist politics, German Idealist philosophy, and respect for the natural sciences the promise of a new future in philosophy.

Johnston's 2005 debut book, *Time Driven*,<sup>1</sup> expanded Freud's account of drives by identifying a conflict in the heart of the drives themselves. This first work drew heavily on Lacan, and was an important further contribution to molding continental philosophy with the insights of psychoanalysis. But Johnston's rise to public prominence can be linked most directly to his second and third books, in which he established himself as a peerless and insatiable interpreter of the philosophy of Žižek. In 2008, Johnston published the acclaimed *Žižek's Ontology*.<sup>2</sup> Against the frequent tendency to take Žižek for a witty philosophical observer of popular culture, Johnston energetically captured the serious ontology underlying Žižek's work: a specific fusion of Lacan with German Idealism that is not dissimilar to Johnston's own. This was followed in 2009 by *Badiou, Žižek, and Political Transformations*, in

<sup>1</sup> Adrian Johnston, *Time Driven: Metapsychology and the Splitting of the Drive*, Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2005.

<sup>2</sup> Adrian Johnston, *Žižek's Ontology: A Transcendental Materialist Theory of Subjectivity*, Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2008.

which Žižek was read in parallel with his older comrade-in-arms Alain Badiou, a duo that might be said to dominate European philosophy at present.<sup>3</sup> While demonstrating the close link between ontology and politics in these two thinkers, Johnston was frankly critical of the details of this link, which in his view has unfortunate political consequences. In 2013, Johnston followed up with two additional books. There was the long-awaited joint work with Malabou, *Self and Emotional Life*,<sup>4</sup> and the manifesto-like *Prolegomena to Any Future Materialism*.<sup>5</sup> That would make the present book his sixth unless the relentless Johnston, a veritable furnace of human energy, has already completed other works of which I am still unaware.

The title of *Adventures in Transcendental Materialism* tells us everything essential about the contents of the book. On the one hand, Johnston is an ardent materialist, proud of his debt to the Marxist tradition and lacking in all sympathy even for oblique flirtations with religion (see for example his blunt critique of Quentin Meillassoux's concept of the virtual God).<sup>6</sup> But the qualification of materialism as transcendental signals a distance from the old-school materialism in which particles of physical matter exist independently from the human mind. Johnston's combined debt to Lacan and German Idealism forbids him any appeal to such things-in-themselves, and hence the "matter" of materialism tends to become an obstacle internal to the subject itself rather than something lying outside it. (This much he shares with Žižek.) In turn, the word "adventures" refers to the organizational style of the book. Just as a pirate captain calls first on Jamaica, then Barbados, Surinam, Madagascar, and Ceylon, Johnston uses the present work to call on a variety of dead and living authors whose work is in some way close to his own: the German Idealists, Lacan, Žižek, Martin Hägglund, Jean-Claude Milner, Badiou, Malabou, William Connolly, and Jane Bennett.

All of these dialogues will be of interest to the reader, but three

<sup>3</sup> Adrian Johnston, *Badiou, Žižek, and Political Transformations: The Cadence of Change*, Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2009.

<sup>4</sup> Adrian Johnston and Catherine Malabou, *Self and Emotional Life: Philosophy, Psychoanalysis, and Neuroscience*, New York: Columbia University Press, 2013.

<sup>5</sup> Adrian Johnston, *Prolegomena to Any Future Materialism: The Outcome of Contemporary French Philosophy*, Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2013.

<sup>6</sup> Adrian Johnston, "Hume's Revenge: À Dieu, Meillassoux?," in Levi R. Bryant et al. (eds.), *The Speculative Turn: Continental Materialism and Realism*, Melbourne: Re.press, 2011.

in particular stand out as likely to make an especially lasting impression. Chapters 5 through 7 on Žižek may turn out to be the most significant of this book, since they show the greatest divergence so far between Johnston and the subject of two of his books. While Žižek has long paid serious attention to quantum physics in his work, Johnston finds this emphasis unconvincing, and recommends a turn to biology instead. In so doing, he also takes a distance from contemporary eliminativist approaches in the philosophy of mind. Chapters 8 and 9 show Johnston in friendly combat with the young Swedish philosopher Martin Hägglund of Yale University, whose recent writings on Derrida have sparked an uproar.<sup>7</sup> Precisely because Johnston and Hägglund have so much in common, their differences become especially striking. Finally, I would also call the reader's attention to the remarks in Chapter 12 on Jane Bennett and William Connolly. While Bennett's work has already entered continental philosophy through the admiring approval of the object-oriented ontologists, Connolly is only just beginning to enter the arena, despite his longstanding prominence in political theory. Johnston's closing chapter is among the first to import Connolly's ideas into continental thought.

Although Johnston is technically not a Speculative Realist, he is among the most prominent fellow travelers of the movement, being personally acquainted with its members and often engaged in friendly disagreement with them. For this reason, as well as the importance of Johnston's ideas themselves, *Adventures in Transcendental Materialism* is an important addition to the Speculative Realism series.

Graham Harman  
Ankara  
August 2013

<sup>7</sup> See Martin Hägglund, *Radical Atheism: Derrida and the Time of Life*, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2008.

The task is to think the subject's emergence or becoming from the self-splitting of substance: the subject is not directly the Absolute, it emerges out of the self-blockage of substance, out of the impossibility of substance fully asserting itself as One.

Slavoj Žižek

To the memory of Robert and Thelma Cook,  
with immense love, respect, and gratitude

## Introduction

# Reports From Philosophical Fronts: Exchanges with Contemporaries Past and Present

For philosophical thought particularly, the clashes and struggles arising from confrontations between partisans of different orientations are catalysts absolutely essential for this discipline's vivacity and development. However, not all such confrontations are productive in this way. Conflict-driven philosophical progress is best fueled by a mixture consisting of a finely balanced blend of fiercely stubborn adversarial advocacy and patient mutual understanding sustained by a background of respectful charity.

Over the past several years, I have gradually constructed and refined the position I label "transcendental materialism" within a context informed by a number of live fault lines of theoretical tensions. More precisely, these specific fault lines are rifts between stances (my own and those with which I engage) relating to each other in the above-described promising manner of combining argumentative ferocity with interpretive generosity. Whatever I might have to contribute to certain ongoing conversations in philosophy/theory today, I owe to a wonderfully motley ensemble, a sparkingly multifaceted Marxian "general intellect," of superb interlocutors and debating partners. Transcendental materialism has taken shape in fashions very much determined by its chosen significant others.

The chapters of this book contain, among other things, treatments of a number of living figures along lines informed by transcendental materialism. The current thinkers addressed here include, to provide a non-exhaustive list, Alain Badiou, Jane Bennett, William Connolly, Markus Gabriel, Iain Hamilton Grant, Martin Hägglund, Catherine Malabou, Jean-Claude Milner, Colette Soler, Slavoj Žižek, and Alenka Zupančič. Reflecting the invaluable historical sensibilities of the intellectual traditions of Continental Europe, these authors, as anyone familiar with

them knows, draw deeply and broadly from the history of ideas (philosophical, psychoanalytic, political) in the process of building their own bodies of concepts. Moreover, like all of the people just mentioned, I view the history of ideas (especially as regards philosophy and psychoanalysis) as not merely historical. That is to say, I am convinced that the canonical figures of philosophy and psychoanalysis represent rigorously formulated end-points of particular intellectual possibilities and trajectories, with these end-points continuing to remain viable options up through the present. Such proper names as Spinoza, Hume, Kant, Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, Marx, Freud, and Lacan name theoretical alternatives whose plausibility and enduring appeal are unlikely to disappear anytime soon in the foreseeable future. Hence, these members of the pantheon of the “mighty dead” are as much the contemporaries of transcendental materialism as are Badiou et al. (to refer back to the list at the start of this paragraph).

Through critical readings of these contemporaries past and present, I strive in this book to hone and advance transcendental materialism as a philosophical position with interdisciplinary links. I aim to illustrate herein how and why this theoretical framework of mine relies upon critical employments of resources drawn from German idealism, psychoanalysis, Marxism, and the life sciences. I draw contrasts and sharpen the distinctions between my fashions of working with these varied resources and those practiced by certain other contemporaneous theorists. In so doing, I underscore the differences these contrasts and distinctions make to an understanding of political, religious, and scientific issues central to our present socio-historical circumstances.

The four chapters constituting Part I (“No Illusions: Hegel, Lacan, and Transcendental Materialism”) push off from what I call the “principle of no illusions,” a thesis of transcendental materialism affirming its adamant opposition to mechanistic, reductive, or eliminative materialisms. More precisely, transcendental materialism, as a contemporary extension of historical and dialectical materialisms, crucially entails a principled refusal of recourse to such notions as epiphenomena and “folk psychology,” notions signaling a dismissal of various entities and events as purely illusory *qua* causally inefficacious appearances, falsehoods, fantasies, fictions, unrealities, etc. Instead, in line with Hegelian-Marxian concrete/real abstractions (as well as Lacanian structures that “march in the streets”), my materialism is vehemently

anti-reductive/eliminative for reasons similar to those furnished by Hegel, Marx, and Lacan, among others. Part I elaborates the arguments for this key aspect of transcendental materialism via an examination of criticisms of Spinoza's monistic substance metaphysics spelled out by Hume, Kant, and Hegel as being of continuing contemporary relevance to disputes about what materialism means today.

Chapter 1 ("The Latest System-Program of German Idealism: From Tübingen to Today") performs two tasks. First, it situates transcendental materialism in relation to the history of modernity beginning with the birth of modern science in the early seventeenth century. However, as this chapter's title and sub-title already indicate, the historical reference most emphasized by me here is the philosophical agenda of post-Fichtean German idealism initially forged in the 1790s – more specifically, that of the Tübingen trio of Hölderlin, Schelling, and Hegel (more than that of Novalis and Friedrich Schlegel as contemporaneous Romantic critics of Kant and Fichte). In several important senses, transcendental materialism involves a reactivation of suggestions voiced in the 1796 fragment "The Earliest System-Program of German Idealism" authored by one of these three Tübingen students (which one remaining a matter of disagreement amongst scholars). The second task executed in this chapter is a comparing and contrasting of transcendental materialism with the Žižek of 2012's *Less Than Nothing: Hegel and the Shadow of Dialectical Materialism* (as well as with Gabriel's Žižek-informed "transcendental ontology"). Žižek's work is the most influential inspiration for transcendental materialism. Furthermore, in his recent *magnum opus*, he articulates his own valuable clarifications regarding the defining essential characteristics of transcendental materialism. Chapter 1 also foreshadows the core issues around which revolve the three chapters of Part II ("Žižek: Dossier of an Ongoing Debate").

Chapter 2 ("For a Thoughtful Ontology: Hegel's Immanent Critique of Spinoza") exegetically reconstructs the multi-pronged Spinoza critique delineated by Hegel across the bulk of his corpus (but especially as formulated in his monumental *Science of Logic*). It does so in conjunction with sketches of Hume's, Kant's, and Schelling's critiques of Spinoza too (with Kant's critiques in particular informing Hegel's). I tie the Hegelian immanent (rather than external) critique of Spinozism to the insistence, from the preface to the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, on the requirement that

substance must be thought also as subject (a stipulation central to transcendental materialism as well). Over the course of this reconstruction, I fight on behalf of this Hegel against Althusserian and Deleuzian Spinozist counter-offensives, doing so with an eye to the antagonism between neo-Spinozisms and neo-Hegelianisms seen as a fundamental battle front in today's ongoing struggles concerning the interrelated topics of materialism, realism, and the status of (modern) subjectivity.

Chapter 3 (““Off with their thistleheads!': Against Neo-Spinozism”) expands upon Chapter 2's defenses of Hegel *contra* the neo-Spinozists. Once again on the basis of the no-illusions principle as already explained and justified prior to this juncture, I argue against the structuralist and post-structuralist neo-Spinozisms of Althusser, Deleuze, and their followers as monochromatic world-views in which the negativity of autonomous subjects is indefensibly written off as an illusory epiphenomenon devoid of actual causal efficacy. Turning to “speculative realist” Grant's modified, updated rendition of Schellingian *Naturphilosophie* – Grant and I share convictions regarding the contemporary relevance of revisiting German idealism (including its long unfashionable philosophies of nature) in light of current philosophical controversies – I problematize this rendition on the basis of its Spinozist and Deleuzian tendencies to eclipse from view the speculative-dialectical distances Schelling, like Hegel, takes from Spinoza's monist ontology. Then, while still staying with a focus on recent and current varieties of neo-Spinozism, I address the life-scientific perspectives on these same matters offered by Antonio Damasio and Terrence Deacon. Damasio and Deacon end up advancing arguments against epiphenomenalism – I portray Spinozisms old and new as committed to treating subjectivity and a number of things associated with it as epiphenomenal – resonating with Marx's Hegel-indebted concept of real abstractions.

Chapter 4 (“‘Lacan, our Hegel': Psychoanalysis, Dialectics, and Materialisms”) shifts attention from Hegel to Lacan. As for Žižek, so too for me: Lacanian psychoanalysis is as important as Hegelian philosophy for transcendental materialism. Chapters 2 and 3 reread Hegel through the lens of the principle of no illusions. Accordingly, Chapter 4 applies this lens to Lacan (taking some of its leads from Žižek and Zupančič). Herein, I return to the Lacanian corpus so as to demonstrate how and why Lacan eventually arrives, in his later teachings, at a qualified endorsement of

dialectical materialism. Additionally, and running with some of Zupančič's perspicuous insights, I seek to highlight the distinctive features of Lacan's realism (a realism steering between the poles of nominalism and metaphysical realism) as deeply relevant to contemporary controversies around speculative realism. Needless to say at this point, this simultaneously realist and materialist Lacan is a towering forefather of transcendental materialism (whether Žižek's or mine).

The three chapters constituting Part II are installments from a still-unfolding debate between Žižek and me. My transcendental materialist philosophical framework originated in a certain interpretation of Žižek's Lacanian appropriations of Kant and the post-Kantian German idealists Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel (as per my 2008 book *Žižek's Ontology: A Transcendental Materialist Theory of Subjectivity*). Since then, he and I have been arguing back and forth about what a contemporary materialism can and should be as well as how it ought to be positioned vis-à-vis both politics and science. The stakes of these exchanges include the relevance of Hegelianism to today's natural sciences, the history of Marxism's relations with these same disciplines, the importance (or lack thereof) of the life sciences especially for current philosophical and political thinking, and the status of human freedom within a thoroughly materialist *Weltanschauung*.

Chapter 5 ("Hegel's Luther: Žižek's Materialist Hegelianism") is organized around a close reading of Žižek's 2006 book *The Parallax View*, one of his most substantial philosophical works to date. I focus here on his dialectical materialist handling of the neurosciences; *The Parallax View* contains his most sustained engagement with these sciences thus far, which makes this book particularly important for me given my preoccupations. I contend in this chapter that my modified type of dialectical materialism accomplishes better than Žižek's type his attempted grounding of a dual philosophical-psychoanalytic model of subjectivity in the sciences of the brain.

Chapter 6 ("In Nature More Than Nature Itself: Žižek Between Naturalism and Supernaturalism") originally resulted from an exchange between me and Žižek in a special issue of the journal *Subjectivity*. In this chapter, I respond to his charges that my turns to biology risk naturalizing away key features of non-natural subjectivity *à la* German idealism and Lacanianism. The crux of this dispute concerns how close to or far from a life-science-based

naturalism a materialist theory of the subject with allegiances to Kant, Hegel, Freud, and Lacan should be. I contend that materialism must be closer to naturalism than Žižek allows, while simultaneously insisting that the spontaneous naturalism of the cutting edge of the life sciences is not the semi-reductive paradigm Žižek believes it to be.

Chapter 7 (“Spirit is a Quark: Quantum Physics with Žižek”), following closely on the heels of the above, is a response to Žižek’s reply to the contents of the preceding Chapter. *Contra* my anchoring of foundational aspects of transcendental materialism in biology and its branches (especially neuroscience, genetics, and evolutionary theory), Žižek pleads for basing a renewed materialism on dialectical interpretations of quantum physics. I respond not only by arguing for the greater relevance of biology with respect to envisioning human subjects – I also show how Žižek’s recourse to physics violates the core principles of his own ontology and ends up inadvertently promoting a reductive monism at odds with his dialectical theories of subjectivity.

The five chapters constituting Part III (“Transcendental Materialism’s Significant Others: Psychoanalysis, Science, and Religion”), as this Part’s sub-title announces, explore the psychoanalytic, scientific, and religious dimensions and repercussions of transcendental materialism. This materialism draws extensively upon both Freudian-Lacanian analysis as well as the life sciences (two of its “significant others”). It does so aware of and interested in the politico-religious implications of materialist philosophy, analytic metapsychology, and modern science overall. In particular, I link transcendental materialism, faithful to its historical sources, to a radical leftist atheism (specifically, a both Marxist and psychoanalytic atheism) willing and able to do full materialist justice to phenomena otherwise pulling for an embrace of idealist spiritualism when the only alternatives are “contemplative” as non-dialectical materialisms (a situation described by Marx in the first of his “Theses on Feuerbach”). That is to say, transcendental materialism, in fidelity to Marxist historical and dialectical materialisms, aims to surpass mechanistic and eliminative scientific philosophies while nonetheless avoiding relapses into the metaphysical visions of theosophical confabulating. Succinctly put, it aspires to be both non-reductive and yet stringently atheistic at the same time (the latter being a shared commitment between Marxism and Freudianism). In addition to my disciplinary signifi-

cant others, I also engage with a whole host of my contemporaries throughout the chapters forming this last Part of *Adventures in Transcendental Materialism*.

Chapter 8 (“Life Terminable and Interminable: Hägglund and the Afterlife of the Afterlife”) scrutinizes Hägglund’s 2008 book *Radical Atheism: Derrida and the Time of Life*. Therein, Hägglund powerfully calls into question, from a Derridean standpoint, just how seriously strident and internally coherent the atheism of psychoanalysis really is when all is said and done. In response, I defend analytic atheism against Hägglund’s criticisms of it and, in parallel, mount counter-attacks against his own Derrida-indebted position. What hangs in the balance of the disagreements between Hägglund and me is the question of what a thoroughly consistent philosophical critique of religion relying upon (among others) Freud and Lacan looks like in the end. Both of us also have an eye on recent attempts, in certain circles of Continentalists, to revive and/or update elements of traditional monotheistic religions (as per permutations of what has come to be known as “the post-secular turn”).

Chapter 9 (“The true Thing is the (w)hole: Freudian-Lacanian Psychoanalysis and Hägglund’s Chronolibidinal Reading”) is a subsequent installment of my debate with Hägglund. It responds to texts of his appearing after *Radical Atheism*, especially his 2012 book *Dying for Time: Proust, Woolf, Nabokov* (texts in which Hägglund replies to the contents of the preceding chapter). In a manner connecting back with Part I, I redeploy Hegel’s criticism of Schelling’s excessive Spinozism – the former famously dismisses the Absolute of the latter’s philosophies of nature and identity as a “night in which all cows are black” – against Hägglund’s Derridean absolutizing of temporal finitude. I proceed to reveal how this absolutization motivates what arguably are misreadings of Freud and Lacan proposed by Hägglund. Then, I explain why my hybrid Freudian and Lacanian drive theory, as per my 2005 book *Time Driven: Metapsychology and the Splitting of the Drive* (itself critically addressed by Hägglund on several occasions), possesses the virtues of a temporality-concerned reinterpretation of atheistic psychoanalysis while avoiding the pitfalls of Derridean-Hägglundian radical atheist “chronolibidinalism.”





Chapter 10 (“Antiphilosophy and Paraphilosophy: Milner, Badiou, and Antiphilosophical Lacanianism”) takes up Badiou’s notion/category of “antiphilosophy” as developed on the grounds

of his recasting of the history of Western philosophy starting with the ancient Greek split between philosophy and sophistry. In a series of three consecutive unpublished seminars given between 1992 and 1995, Badiou addresses (one per academic year) three figures he identifies as the great antiphilosophers of the present age: Nietzsche, Wittgenstein, and Lacan. Motivated by my philosophical reliance upon Lacan, I contest Badiou's portrait of Lacan as an antiphilosopher, doing so with special focus on the former's 1994–95 seminar (albeit also drawing on his other published discussions of Lacan). In the process, I critically examine Milner's influential glosses on Lacan's complicated, vexed relations with philosophy (apropos these themes, Badiou and Milner have influenced such prominent Lacanians as Žižek, Soler, and François Regnault). I conclude by suggesting that Lacanianism is neither separable from nor identical with philosophy, defying capture by schematizations such as Badiou's opposition between the philosophical and the antiphilosophical.

Chapter 11 (“The Real Unconscious: Malabou, Soler, and Psychical Life After Lacan”) defends Lacan along another front, one opened up by Malabou's critical appraisals of Freudian-Lacanian psychoanalysis. Malabou and I recently published a co-authored book entitled *Self and Emotional Life: Philosophy, Psychoanalysis, and Neuroscience*. Many of the themes and topics at the heart of *Adventures in Transcendental Materialism* (as already summarized here) are connected with the contents of *Self and Emotional Life*. In this chapter here, I continue my dialogue with Malabou, pushing our debate with each other beyond what is contained in our co-authored book. In sympathy with some of Soler's excellent work on Lacan (in her 2009 book *Lacan, l'inconscient réinventé* and 2011 book *Les affects lacaniens*), I rebut Malabou's depth-hermeneutic rendition of the unconscious as it figures in her neuroscience-inspired criticisms of psychoanalysis. Unlike Malabou, I see analysis as vindicated rather than undermined by the exponential progress made in the past several decades by empirical, experimental studies of the human central nervous system. For me, a novel Lacanian neuropsychanalysis, constructed under the supervision of a transcendental materialist stance, is a real possibility for the twenty-first century. This chapter helps to explain this view.

Chapter 12 (“Toward a Grand Neuropolitics: Why I am Not an Immanent Naturalist or Vital Materialist”), bringing *Adventures*

*in Transcendental Materialism* to a close, addresses the political theory duo of Connolly and Bennett. It focuses on the former's 2002 book *Neuropolitics: Thinking, Culture, Speed* and 2011 book *A World of Becoming* as well as the latter's 2010 book *Vibrant Matter: A Political Ecology of Things*. On first glance, Connolly's framework of "immanent naturalism" looks to be very similar to my transcendental materialism. However, there is a wide divide lurking here with major ramifications. Whereas Connolly's and Bennett's theoretical perspectives ultimately are rooted, in terms of the history of philosophy, in Spinoza's monistic ontology, my position is heavily reliant on the Hegel who is sharply critical of Spinoza for a number of important theoretical and practical reasons (with this twelfth and final chapter thus circling back to Part I above). Basically, this chapter pits the neo-Spinozism shared between Connolly's immanent naturalism and Bennett's "vital materialism" against the neo-Hegelianism of transcendental materialism. Given that Connolly and Bennett are motivated by interests in intervening with respect to environmental problems on the basis of their theories, I sketch out, with reference to ecology, the ethical, political, and practical differences resulting from this contrast between their Spinozism and my Hegelianism. Hence, this book closes by gesturing toward the contemporary significance of transcendental materialism not only for philosophy, but also for many of the socially shared circumstances and challenges characterizing the early twenty-first century.



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